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Abstract
Most corporate finance models of firm behavior study the typical
US corporation: one firm with a large set of dispersed shareholders.
In contrast, in many countries around the world, firms are often held
in groups with complicated ownership structures. These groups, of-
ten referred to as pyramids, raise very distinct questions about firm
behavior; these questions that are especially relevant for developing
countries where these groups are most prevalent. In this paper, we
first describe some empirical research we have performed on the na-
ture of agency problems within pyramids. We then discuss a variety
of questions, both theoretical and empirical, that remain to be unex-
plored.

I. Introduction
Ownership structures in the United States are simple. Firms typically have
dispersed shareholders and when they own other firms, they typically have
them as a subsidiary. But this pattern is not the norm around the world. In
fact, while they may seem exotic from a US perspective, many firms around
the world are organized into so-called pyramids. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1999) find that approximately 25% of the firms in their
sample are members of pyramids. In a pyramid, an ultimate owner uses
indirect ownership to maintain control over a large group of companies. The
mechanics of this are illustrated with a stylized example in Figure 1. Here,
the ultimate owner owns enough shares (assumed here to be 20%) to control
firm A. Firm A, in turn, owns enough shares to control B, and so on. This
chain of ownership allows the ultimate owner to control all the firms, even
the ones in which he has no direct ownership. The ultimate owner, therefore,
maintains control over all firms in the pyramid without being entitled to
much of their cashflows. In Figure 1, for example, if firm D pays a dividend
of a hundred dollars, 20 of these dollars go to firm C, five to firm B, and so
on, with just about thirty cents going to the ultimate owner.
INSERT FIGURE 1
By contrast, in the typical US firm, as well as in many other stand-alone
firms around the world, formal control and cash flow rights usually go hand
in hand. In this case, the agency problem comes primarily from managers'
limited ownership, from the potential divergence between informal control
and cash flow rights when managers have limited ownership. Pyramids, on
the other hand, raises a set of very different agency problems that are rarely
discussed in standard corporate finance models. In this paper, we first first
discuss one such question, i.e. whether firms in pyramids "tunnel," and then
lay out several important open questions in this area of research.
II. Tunneling
The separation of ownership and control in a pyramid generates strong incen-
tives for the ultimate owner to divert resources between the different firms in
a pyramid. In the stylized example in Figure 1, it is clearly in the ultimate
owner's interest to divert profits from firm D to firm A, thereby transform-
ing a thirty cent gain into a 20 dollar gain. This diversion, which has been
referred to as tunneling (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
2000), can take several forms: high (or low) interest rate loans, selling of
inputs or purchasing of outputs at non-market prices, leasing of assets, and
guarantees of other companies borrowing are only a few of the ways compa-
nies may tunnel resources across each other.
If prevalent, tunneling can have large consequences. For example, during
the emerging market crises of 1997-98, many alleged that tunneling was a
root cause. More generally, because minority shareholders effectively face a
tax when resources are tunneled, this may raise a serious barrier to financial
development. The very process of transferring resources may also entail social
costs. For example, it may cloud accounting numbers and make it hard to
infer the health of specific companies.
Establishing the prevalence of tunneling activities and quantifying their
magnitude has been a notoriously difficult empirical task, in part because
ultimate owners try to tunnel in subtle and hard-to-detect ways. In Bertrand,
Mehta and Mullainathan (2002), we lay out a general procedure to get at
this important measurement question. This procedure can be most easily
understood with an analogy with brain imaging techniques, such as PET
(Positron Emission Tomography) scans. In a PET scan, a scanner tracks
blood flow in the brain by following the path of radioactively tagged material,
such as glucose, that has been injected into the blood. Similarly, we propose
to follow the flow of cash through a pyramid by tracking the propagation of
exogenous shocks to different firms in that pyramid.
Going back to our example in Figure 1, consider a shock which we expect
to raise the profits of a firm X by a hundred dollars (for example, one could
build such expectations based on industry-specific exchange rate shocks or
on the performance of other stand-alone firms in firm X's industry). By
studying the propogation of this shock through the pyramid, we can learn
whether and how much tunneling is occurring. First, if money is tunneled
out of firm X, we expect firm X's profits to rise by less than 100 dollars, the
shortfall indicating the amount of extraction. Second, since tunneling ought
to be more prevalent lower down in the pyramid (where cash flow rights are
weak), we would expect this shortfall to be larger the lower firm X is in the
pyramid. That means, in our example of Figure 1, we would expect a greater
shortfall in firm D than in firm A. Third, we would expect other firms in the
pyramid, the recipients of tunneling, to respond to the shock to firm X. In our
example, we would expect firm A to respond to firm D's shock. Moreover,
we would expect this last relationship to be asymmetric. Firm D should not
respond to firm A's shock. 1
As long as one can observe group membership and position of firms in
a group, accounting performance for these firms, as well as compute some
expectations of true performance (such as based on industry-specific shocks),
one can translate these simple intuitions into an econometric test.
As an illustration, we apply this test on a panel of Indian firms between
1989 and 1999. Our results suggest that tunneling is quite prevalent in
India. We find evidence for the full set of predictions outlined above. First,
group firms respond less than one for one to annual shocks to their earnings,
with firms lower down in a pyramid responding the least. Second, only firms
higher up a pyramid show sensitivity to earnings shocks to other firms in their
group, and most notably to shocks affecting lower down firms. Moreover,
the economic magnitude of these estimated tunneling effects is large. For
example, group firms are on average about 30% less sensitive to shocks to
their earnings than stand-alone firms are; however, group firms at the top of
their pyramid are as sensitive to shocks to their earnings than stand-alones
are.
Our ability to empirically isolate tunneling allows us to answer two ad-
ditional questions. First, through what balance sheet items does tunneling
occur? Using various decompositions, we find that most of the tunneling
appears on non-operating profits. Thus, for India at least, buying of inputs
or selling of outputs at non-market prices does not appear to be an impor-
tant means of tunneling. Second, does market valuation reflect the extent
of tunneling? Using simple Q measures (more specifically, market to book
ratios benchmarked against industry, size and time), we find that firms with
high Q are more sensitive to both their own shock and shocks to other firms
in their group. Moreover, firms whose group has a higher Q are more sen-
sitive to their own shock and slightly less sensitive to shocks to the rest of
their group. These results suggest that equity prices at least in part reflect
tunneling activities.
These results suggest that, despite the empirical hurdles, some progress
lr
This last distinction will be crucial when considering other theories of why shocks may
propagate through a pyramid, most notably risk-sharing theories.
can be made in a fairly intuitive econometric. But they also raise some
intriguing questions that are still waiting answers.
III. Open Questions
Given that their cash flow rights are being violated, why would minority
shareholders ever choose to take a minority position in a pyramid? There are
several possible answers to this question awaiting further investigation. First,
one could argue that minority owners may not fully appreciate the extent of
tunneling. While this may not be an equilibrium outcome, it is a plausible
explanation given the disclosure environment in many countries. In India,
for example, simply obtaining ownership structure data within a pyramid is a
difficult process. Shareholders may have no way of knowing whether a given
firm is at the top or a bottom of a pyramid. This explanation however seems
at odds with the stock price evidence above, which suggests that markets at
least partly understand the extent of tunneling.
A second possibility is that groups add value in other ways that coun-
terbalance the inefficiencies tunneling creates. For example, if the benefits
of political connections, infrastructure provision or economies of scale are
large within a group, then even firms lower down in a pyramid could on
net outperform stand-alone firms. Much care will be required in empirically
evaluating this possibility since pyramidal firms differ from stand-alones in
so many other dimensions.
A third possibility is that minority owners have no other choice. This
could happen if pyramids are primarily formed through acquisitions. In this
case, the announcement of an acquisition by a pyramid will result in the tar-
get's stock price dropping if the acquisition is predicted to be successful and
the target will end up lower down in the pyramid: minority owners in the
target company will experience a capital loss immediately upon announce-
ment of the acquisition that equals the loss of future profits to be tunneled
out. This third possibility highlights why some future research should go
into an empirical investigation of how pyramids evolve over time. Are they
in fact formed through acquisition?
A second broad area of interest is investment in pyramidal firms. In
the discussion so far, we have taken profits as given when in fact they are
the result of investment decisions made by the ultimate owner. But when
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investment is a possibility, why would ultimate owners decide to tunnel re-
sources out on an annual basis? Wouldn't many annual shocks be reinvested
in the firm so as to raise future profits for tunneling in the future? This
argument contrasts with the empirical results, where we are finding quite a
large amount of immediate tunneling of profits. What is needed is a broader
framework to understand how a controlling shareholder who has the long-
term ability to tunnel will invest and tunnel profits out of a firm.
Finally, in a related vein, it would be interesting to know how tunneling
changes when profits become negative. This is a question we cannot address
because our data too imprecise to study in details possible differences in the
tunneling of positive and negative profits. The broader question is whether
negative profits should be tunneled? Tunneling when profits are negative
would actually mean that the ultimate owner is "propping" up lower down
firms by putting resources in. But why would he do this? Johnson and
Friedman (2000) suggest one intriguing possibility. Since the ultimate owner
can tunnel in the future, it is actually in his interest to keep struggling firms
afloat even if they are lower down in the pyramid. Clearly, testing this
possibility is central to improing our description of how pyramids operate.
IV. Conclusion
Pyramids are a prevalent way to organize firms across the world but our
understanding of their dealings and efficiency implications is quite limited so
far. Fortunately, rather comprehensive data sources have recently become
available in several countries that might help us substantially improve our
knowledge of these organizational structures in the coming years. The ques-
tions highlighted in this paper are only a small sample of the many issues
that we think should be tackled with these data sources. There is much to
be done and we have the means to do it.
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Figure 1 : Example of Pyramid
Arrows indicate direction of ownership
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